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CHAPTER 5
UNSCOP AND THE PARTITION RECOMMENDATION
(A.)  INFLUENTIAL FACTORS
When commissions or committees, particularly Royal Commissions in the British parliamentary tradition,
are set up to investigate a problem and recommend a solution, their deliberations and conclusions are
influenced by a number of factors.  First and foremost is the make-up of the committee and the
convictions and predispositions of its members.  These we attempted to clarify in the last chapter.
However, if these predispositions were the only factors, a committee would not have to hold hearings,
would not need the benefit of expertise and would not have to conduct fact finding missions.  The
members could merely meet and vote based on their prior convictions.
The reality is that a number of other factors enter the equation once a committee begins its work.  The
first and foremost, but behind the prior convictions of the members, is what they experience during the
period of the committee.  Who and what do they hear?  What do they see?  Both of these played a very
dramatic role in the consideration of the committee.
Another factor that has a powerful influence on the conduct and consideration of a special commission is
the role of the experts attached to the committee.  As we shall see in the case of the UNSCOP Special
Committee and in contrast to many or possibly most Special Commissions, the role of the full time
mandarins seems to have been marginal rather than central.
Finally, the product of a commission is in good part the product of the interaction of its members and the
guidance of the Chairperson.  After all, a Specialo Commission dealing with a problem in the political
arena is being asked to make a judgement.  Legal precedent, historical factors, facts, principles,
anticipated consequences, existing conditions, the goals of the system—all these must be weighed and
balanced in the outcome.  The different weights to allocate to the various factors will be influenced by
colleagues on the Special Commission.
This, of course, presumes that the Commission is independent of the pressures of coercive force or
material influence.  It also presumes they are not under the authoritative direction of any outside body. 
Though the first two factors—coercive power and material influence—were totally absent from the
considerations of the Special Committee, in the case of at least one member, Entezam, it is possible he
was.  In the General Assembly and in the first meeting to deliberate on a decision, he stated that he “has
1  This could have also meant he was free to follow his conscience.
This does not mean the proceedings of a committee are not subject to outside influence.  Quite the
contrary.  They can be, and, in this case, were critical.  Different political considerations—where the
individual comes from and the political weight given to different factors—will greatly influence
perceptions, deliberations and conclusions.  This was particularly true in this case as different members
were clearly influenced by the presence of Muslim populations in their own countries and/or the
experience with Jews, in particular the plight of the Jewish refugees and the victimization the Jews
suffered under Nazi Germany.
(B.)  THE CONDUCT OF THE COMMISSION
Committees, however, are not just bombarded with facts, experiences, and expertise which interact
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with their own principles, political concerns, and convictions to produce a particular brew.  Committees
follow a process.  ;When Trygve Lie sent the committee off to Palestine very shortly after their opening
hearings, ostensibly to escape the influence or the perceived influence of the large and powerful Jewish
community in New York, it also meant that the committee would not be in the hands o;f the U.N.
mandarins and experts.  Thus, their statements of facts and analysis were bound to have, and did have,
a far more marginal impact than the experience of the committee.
The whole process took approximately three months.  The first formal session of the Committee was
convened on May 26, 1947 by Trygve Lie.  Two days before, the Arab governments, in a meeting at
An Shass, called for a total halt to Jewish immigration and insisted on immediate independence for
Palestine as an Arab state.  By June 3rd the Committee made its initial decision that liaison officers would
be appointed from the Jewish Agency, Britain, and the Arab Higher Committee.  Just five days before
the latter had its historic meeting in Bludan, Syria, where it made its secret resolutions concerning
economic sanctions against the British and Americans.
The substantive work of the Committee began on June 11th with the departure of the main body of
delegates and alternates to Palestine.  The Higher Committee organized a one-day general strike in the
Palestine Arab community to greet the Committee on its arrival.  On June 16th the Committee held its
first full day session in Jerusalem and met in private with members of the Palestine government.  That
evening, Sandstrom as Chairman, broadcast an appeal for Arab representatives to come before the
Committee.  On June 17th, open hearings began.
June 19th to July 3rd were taken up with site visits beginning in Haifa.  It was during this period, on June
29th, that the Stein gang executed three British soldiers in Tel Aviv and wounded three others in Haifa. 
On July 4th the Committee met with Ben Gurion and, on the following day, with Chaim Weizmann, a
meeting followed a day later by the British announcement that Irgun prisoners would be executed and
three days later by the kidnapping of two sergeants by the Irgun.  The most memorable experience,
however, occurredon July 18th with the capture of the Exodus with 4500 Jewish refugees on board, a
capture witnessed by some of the Special Committee members.
To compensate for the boycott of the Arab Higher Committee, official delegates of the Arab League for
Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen met twice with the Committee in Beirut
beginning on July 22nd.  There was a second side trip to Amman to meet with Abdullah.
The month, however, would end with three dramatic events on July 29th.  The British hung three Irgun
terrorists.  The Irgun hung two British sergeants.  And the Exodus entered Port-de-Boue, France where
they began a hunger strike, refused to disembark and were eventually sent back to Hamburg and
internment in German camps, all this just as the Special Commission began to deliberate on August 6th in
Geneva on the contents of its report.
Those hearings followed the logic of elimination.  Instead of beginning with ideal solutions or even
desired solutions, the Committee began by eliminating those clearly not desired or least desired.  During
the Geneva sessions, after the first few meetings, a side trip was made by some of the members and
alternates to the DP camps in Europe.  By the end of the month they had completed their work and
submitted majority and minority reports, a remarkable achievement in itself in just three months of work.
(C.)  THE EXPERIENCE OF THE COMMITTEE
If the predispositions of the members of the Committee were of primary importance, the experiences of
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the members—what they saw and what they heard—were exceedingly critical.
Since both the Jews and the Arabs were adamantly opposed to the continuation of a British or any
outside rule, since the British had been increasingly unable to maintain control, even with the presence of
100,000 troops (40,000 troops were sufficient to prevent trouble over Suez in Egypt, a country with
over 10 times the population of Palestine), and since the generally liberal membership of UNSCOP
seemed predisposed against colonial forms of rule in general, it was highly unlikely that the committee
would recommend a continuation of foreign control over Palestine except as an interim measure. 
The predisposition to terminate the Mandate was strongly reinforced by serendipity and the opportunity
these circumstances provided for the Zionists to achieve propaganda victories.  On the day the
Committee held its first hearings in Jerusalem, three convicted Irgun terrorists were sentenced to hang
by the British.  After an appeal from the parents of the three condemned men, UNSCOP agreed, after
considerable debate and the opposition of Rahman, Rand and Blom, to intervene in light of the U.N.’s
call for all parties to refrain from acts of violence.
The decision of the British to hang the three terrorists was an inauspicious start.  When this was
combined with the British unwillingness  to appear before the Committee in open session [in spite of the
compassion and neutrality of MacGillvary], the British began with two strikes against them.  The third
strike took place on the last day of hearings of UNSCOP in Palestine, on July 18th.  The smoking and
gashed hull of the Exodus with 4500 Jewish refugees aboard, including dead and wounded from a battle
with the British navy, was hauled into Haifa harbour.2  Sandstrom and Simic were witnesses to the
transfer of the wounded, some on stretchers, as well as other survivors, many wearing bandages, to
wire cages aboard the S.S. Ocean Vigour and other British ships for transport back to Europe.  As if
this were not enough, the publicity continued to blacken the British reputation as Bevin ordered the
refugees to be returned to Hamburg, Germany by force.
The whole affair, from the first engagement on board
ship to the final mishandling of the refugees by
British soldiers at Hamburg and then transfer to
camps in the British-occupied zone of Germany, was
conveyed to the world by a well-oiled publicity
machine.  The British, and Bevin, in particular,
were outmaneuvered at every step, and the inhumanity
of Britain’s Palestine policy, in its refugee aspect,
were indelibly inscribed on world public opinion... 
The Exodus affair....demonstrated to the world quite
clearly to what extent the British had lost control
over Palestine.3 
As Wm. Roger Louis phrased it, the Exodus affair was, “a catastrophe for Britain’s moral reputation
                    
    2Michael Cohen provides evidence that the British commander was at the point of giving up and allowing the
captain of the Exodus to beach his ship when the Jewish Agency ordered the captain of the Exodus to surrender
(1986, p. 81).
    3Cohen (1986), 81; 91 cf. Bethell (1978), pp. 316-333.
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through the world”.4 
The option of a continuing role for Britain in Palestine could no longer be taken seriously by the U.N.
Special Committee on Palestine.  The hanging of the three Irgun terrorists on July 29th, after UNSCOP
had left Palestine, the reprisal hanging by the Irgun of the two captured British sergeants and the
subsequent outburst of antisemitism in Britain5 only reinforced the conviction that the British rule in
Palestine was over.  In light of the adamant Arab and Jewish opposition to an ongoing role for Britain,
the determination of both the Jews and Arabs to  obtain self-rule, and the deepening opposition in
Britain to carry the extremely high costs of further involvement in Palestine, the transfer of the Mandate
to a trusteeship administered by Britain, was, quickly rejected by the Committee at its first session, even
as an interim measure.
(D.)  A TAXONOMY OF ALTERNATIVES
When the Committee convened in Geneva on August 6th, they were presented with a very focussed
agenda with an initial brief consideration to history, law, rights, and the genesis of the Palestine question.
 The members quickly plunged into the necessity for a change and the alternatives available.  It was
clear from Sandstrom’s lineal list of alternatives:
(a.)  Jewish state
(b.)  Arab state
(c.)  bilateral (sic!) state  [meant binational]
(d.)  federal state
(e.)  cantonization scheme
(f.)  partition
that dependency solutions (continued British administration or even U.N. administration as Blunche had
suggested) through a trusteeship would only be relevant as an interim measure.  The focus would be on
a permanent solution.  It was at this time that Sandstrom set the stage for majority and minority reports
by suggesting that once the committee opted for one of the above alternatives, those who opted for the
majority would constitute a sub-committee to deal with the technical issues—boundaties, if required,
constitution, facilities (railways, post office, etc.) and Holy Places.  The  committee would then have to
deal with issues of timing and interim measures as well as the Jewish question in general (i.e. the
refugees).  It was clear that Sandstrom structured the discussion so that the issue of immigration and
refugees would be one aspect of the problem, but the central focus would be on the political structure of
Palestine.
The order of alternatives was a lineal one and not a logical classification.  It excluded dependent
solutions (trusteeship under U.K. or U.N. auspices as alternative solutions.  After a brief consideration
of the three country solutions (Arab, Jewish, or binational state) proposed by Bunche, two federal
alternatives were interposed—one with provinces and one with far more autonomous cantons.  Ivan
Rand of Canada, in the process of the deliberatins, would interpose another alternative between the
federal proposals and partition, a confederation in which the two partitioned states would be combined
in an economic union.
                    
    4Louis (1984), 464, cf. Cohen (1982) 245.
    5Cohen (1982) 245.
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The following taxonomy reconstructs the alternatives available to the committee and indicates by the
bold type those not even considered:
Dependent Solutions
(trusteeships)
            U.K.                     U.N.                     Alternate
        administration          administration                  State
Administration
                                                                             
Independent Solutions
Unitary State              Federal                  Partition   
--Arab                     --Provinces              --2 independent states
--Jewish                   --Cantons                --1 independent Jewish
state and Arab portion
--Binational                                          annexed to Transjordan
                                                    --confederation
                                                                             
                                                   
                                                    
The omissions are significant.  The easiest to explain is the omission of the Partition alternative with the
Transjordan option.  As the Secretariat Memorandum had stated, “it is doubtful if the Special
Committee has any authority to include Trans-Jordan in any proposal scheme of solution.”6  What is
more difficult to explain is the omission of Trusteeship as anything more than a short-term interim
solution since this was the clear choice and impetus of the U.N. Secretariat as contained in the initial
Memorandum prepared for the discussions of the Committee.
(E.)  THE ELIMINATION OF THE DEPENDENCY OPTION
Part of the explanation for the elimination of Trusteeship as a solution was the very way the committee
proceeded.  It went to Palestine to see and hear for itself and was not trapped by the advice of experts.
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 Secondly, the discussion proceeded, not on the basis of the memorandum prepared by the Secretariat
before the Committee was even formed, but one drafted by the Chairman with the assistance of the
Secretariat.  It was a practical document structured with the options least desired at first and the
Chairman’s choice last.  It was clear that Sandstrom set the stage for a logic of elimination to select the
alternative which provided the ‘least injustice’ rather than one which set out to implement some ideal of
justice.
However, the most important factors which eliminated the idea of continuing dependency was the
experience of the committee members in their on-site visits.  As it emerged in the first meeting to
deliberate the content of the Report in Geneva on August 6th, all the members, except Hood and Blom,
opted clearly and unequivocally for independence.  Rand favoured partition with an economic union. 
Rahman said, “nothing (was) possible but independence.”  Salazar asserted that, “Palestine must have
self-government.”  Simic favoured independence, but for “Palestine as a whole”.  Lisicky said that,
“only independence can be the solution.”  Granados also opted for “immediate independence”. 
Entezam said the “Mandate must end and independence be given to Palestine”.  Fabregat provided as
reasons for opting for independence that the “Work of Jews in Palestine astonished me.  Jewish people
want independence and we cannot fight this.”  Sandstrom favoured partition after a short transitory
period of a year.
Only Hood and Blom hesitated to support virtually immediate independence.  In the case of Hood, it
was not that he was against “self-determination and the independence of people”.  Quite the reverse. 
He ardently advocated these principles.  But since the practicality and workability of partition—the
“only answer” he envisioned and to which he saw “no alternative”—seemed questionable, Trusteeship
“based clearly on the principle of Charter may be considered”.  It was clear that the logic of eliminating
alternatives was forcing Hood into a paradoxical position—support for Trusteeship, and hence
continuing dependency, while insisting that the Trusteeship be governed by principles of independence
and self-determination.
Blom even was more overtly equivocal.  “Independence should be the arm of the final solution” but it
“might be necessary even to have independence together with some kind of interim/international
machinery to arbitrate differences”, though he immediately questioned whether it was possible to have
both independence and dependence even in the weak form of limiting that independence by an
arbitration mechanism since that would run counter to the principle of the sovereignty and equality of
independent states.
The Committee overwhelmingly favoured virtually immediate independence
-- not because the Arabs and Jews demanded it and the Arabs claimed the mandate was illegal.  They
all concurred that the mandate was perfectly legal.  It was left to Sandstrom to summarize the
arguments for legality which he did in a “Memorandum on Certain Legal Aspects of the Partition
Scheme”, citing the Treaty of Sevres, the assignment of a mandate for Palestine by the Supreme
Allied Powers in April of 1920, the confirmation by the League of Nations on July 24, 1922, and
the Treaty of Lausanne which gave final disposition to the claim of the Arab countries in Article 16. 
The absence of the League did nothing to change the sovereign powers vested in Britain as the
mandatory authority.
The only basis of a legal claim by the Arabs was possession, and such a claim provides a strong case
for the right to rule a country excluding other people.  But self-determination as a principle is not
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absolute but is qualified, particularly in cases of mixed populations.  Further,
Where there exist different nationalities in the same
country each group of the population can rely on the
principle of possession and self-determination for
claiming independent (sic).  Nothing in international
law prevents granting of independence to the different
nationalities.  There is no rule in international law
which prescribes the indivisibility of a country.7
Further, the pledges given to the Jews for a homeland have legal validity which “the promises to the
8
One further legal issue remained.  Though the mandatory Power had the right to implement partition, the
U.N. can recommend a partition solution (or any other) but, “does not seem to have any legal ground to
impose a solution  unless the mandate is in due order transmitted into a trusteeship with the U.N. as
administering authority”.9 (my italics)  The only alternative source of legal authority is if peace is
threatened.
The members not only concurred with the legality of the Mandate, but with the exception of Rand and
Salazar, they agreed it had not worked.  Their reasons in part explain why they not only dismissed any
possibility of British continuation but why almost all of them ruled out trusteeship under a U.N.
administration as well.
For Rahman, who, with Entezam was most partial to the Arab case, agreed they were in error in
contending the Mandate was illegal, but, he argues, its terms were inconsistent, contradictory, ill-
conceived and ignored the principle of self-determination.  He could not then argue for Trusteeship
without contradicting himself.
Garcia Salazar was one of the few to disagree with the overwhelming majority opinion expressed by
Rahman that the Mandate was unworkable.  On the contrary, he contended it had worked.  The
“Mandate has been accomplished—there is a National Home in Palestine—even a Jewish
Government.”  But it was precisely because it had worked that it was “time for self-government in
Simic, in contrast to Salazar, argued the Mandate had not fulfilled its purposes on three counts.  The
general obligation to serve the well-being and development of the population remained unfulfilled. 
Secondly, though Palestine was a Class A Mandate (in which Britain was expected only to provide
advice and administrative support), it was run as a Crown Colony with no self-governing institutions. 
Thirdly, the goal of a National Home for the Jewish people was “beset by complications”.  Thus,
although the Mandate was legal, Britain had not fulfilled the spirit or the terms of the Mandate.
Granados argued for independence.  More important than even the faults of the British, was the success
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of the Jews, their spirit, their work, and their determination to have a land and state of their own where
they would not be subject to persecution.  The British policy had been determined by its colonial
interests, its condescension to both Jews and Arabs (but particularly Jews) and had “failed utterly”. 
This led to a conclusion favouring immediate independence. 
Entezam, also confessed admiration for the efforts of the Jews and acknowledged the role of imperial
interests.  However, he seemed more concerned with the impracticality of continuing the Mandate than
any past failures.  In fact, Entezam was one of the few to defend limits on immigration on the basis of
‘absorptive capacity’.
Fabregat returned to the theme of British failure—the “Mandate provision for (a) National Home and
preparation of people for self-government—twenty-five years later these objectives (are) unfulfilled”.
Sandstrom concurred that the Mandate was unworkable.  He noted, presumably in response to Blom’s
remark that it was a “Pity that the League of Nations could not pass judgement on this point” (the
limitation of immigration by the British White Paper of 1939), that the “Mandate’s commission was
unanimously of the opinion that the White Paper was not consistent with any interpretation that could be
given to the Mandate”.  However, Sandstrom seemed more concerned with pushing the committee
towards resolving the essential paradox—how to grant self-determination to both communities which
would be peaceful.  But not without Ivan Rand contradicting Sandstrom’s assertion that the mandate
was merely a statement of policy.  for Rand, it was a legal undertaking10 and, as became evident in his
Memorandum presenting a confederation proposal—two states joined in an economic and social
union—it was a spiritual obligation as well (a very different one than the “spiritual”—i.e. politically
idealistic—plan on which he claimed the bi-nationalist to be living).  For Rand, the first principle was
“the sovereign interest in the Commonwealth resides in the United Nations forever” because Palestine
was the home of three great world religions.
If anything argued for some continuing trusteeship, this last point, rather than Blom’s problem of
enforcement or Hood’s problem of arbitration, would push for a continuing U.N. Trusteeship.  But
Rand was caught up not only by the spirituality of the land but by the uniqueness of the Jewish people. 
A homeland for the Jewish people was not only a legal provision of the Mandate and a refuge for
oppressed Jews, but “as a condition of the rehabilitation of the Jewish spirit”.  To accomplish this,
Jewish self-government without outside interference was a requisite.
Thus, for very very different reasons—the current unworkability of the Mandate, the failure of the British
to fulfill its terms, the            of the Arabs for independence, the support for self-determination, the
obligation to allow the Jews to develop their own homeland, to fulfill the Mandate, to provide a refuge
for Jews and fulfill their spiritual destiny—the overwhelming thrust of the committee favoured
independence as soon as possible.
The issue of trusteeship would remain a matter of interim legal succession to allow for enforcement,
                    
    10Sandstrom's assertion that it was simply policy, implying clearly it was not internationally legally binding, seems
to be a peculiar slip given his strong defence of the legal validity of the Mandate.  Only Garcia Salazar in his own
Memorandum, while arguing that the Mandate was legal as far as the Powers who signed the Treaty, argued that it
was "not international law bending upon the non-signatory countries...it is a statement of policy which lays down
precise obligations for the Mandatory power and is bending upon the signatory Powers, but has not contractual
character, since it was not made with any other state or group of States." (p. 3)
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major concern to Blom and Sandstrom.
(F.)  A UNITARY OR A DIVIDED STATE
The next option to be considered was whether a unitary or a divided Palestine (partitioned or in a
federation) was to be considered.  Without exception, all the members ruled out both a unitary Arab
state, even with the protection of minority rights.  Even Rahman did not press for a unitary Arab state,
though when polled this was his preference.  Entezam thought that a unitary Arab state was just, but
politically and militarily impractical.11  In the fourth session, he supported Rand’s confederation
proposal, but in the tenth session he opted for a unitary state.12
A Jewish state, a state in which a minority of Jews would rule a majority of Arabs, was not even
discussed.  The only unitary state idea given serious consideration, the proposal which occupied so
much space in the Secretariat Memorandum which had been so impressed by Judah Magnes and the
idealism of Hastromin Hatzain, the idea of a binational state, was given some consideration.  Contrary to
Ben-Gurion’s insistence, the Jews did not present a unified voice to the Special Committee.  Dr. Judah
L. Magnes, from the liberal perspective, and Mapam,  representing the Jewish communists, both
advocated a binational state.  But the case they made before the Committee was weak.  It required first
postponing independence.  Secondly, Jewish immigration was to continue until Jews achieved parity in
population with Arabs, a position which would put Britain in an unbearable position with the Arabs and
was totally unacceptable to the Arabs themselves.  But, finally, the government that would emerge
required good will and co-operation between Jews  and Arabs, for which the evidence was scarce and
in direct conflict with what the committee experienced on its site visits.  The proposal was treated with
scorn by Ivan Rand when he said that he believed “Magnes is living in a spiritual place -- (he) doesn’t
sense the psychology of the Jewish mass in his bi-national state”.  Besides, both Arabs and Jews
needed the state as a symbol of identity.  Salazar, who gave the most empathetic expression to the
perspecitves of both the Jews and the Arabs, ruled out a bi-national state beause immigration was the
essence of the problem in Palestine.  Unlike a cantonal state like Switzerland or a melting pot like the
United States, immigration as a humanitarian aspiration, as a political quest is crucial to the Jews and
equally totally unacceptable to the Arabs.  Division on such a fundamental issue doomed a bi-national
state. Sandstrom was even more scathing in his criticism of bi-nationalism at the opening of the third
informal meeting which began at 9:00 p.m. on August 7th in the office of the Chairman.  Sandstrom
pointed to the contradictions in Magnes’ position, insisting once on a 70:30 return and now parity.  In
addition to the proneness to stalemate pointed out by Fabregat, a bi-national state would be inherently
unstable in the context.  Sandstrom echoed Salazar’s argument—the problem of immigration was not
and  would not be resolved by a bi-national idea.  Sandstrom cited the cases of Scandinavia—regarded
as people of good will—where even there collaboration proved to be impossible between Sweden and
Norway and between Denmark and Iceland.  An external umpire would be needed and that was as
unworkable as the present Mandate.  Only Entezam favoured “some bi-national concept” and believed
the current stalemate between the Jews and Arabs could be resolved.  Granados also leaned towards a
bi-national solution.
                    
    112nd session, p. 1.
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(G.)  FEDERATION OR PARTITION—INFLUENCES
This left the choice between a federal state and partition.  There were a number of factors which shifted
the direction of the decision from a federal solution to one favoring partition.  One was the strategy of
the majority of Zionists.  They appeared reasonable and willing to compromise.  For although they
argued that history, international law (the Balfour Declaration, the League of Nations Mandate, etc.)
spoke for a unified Jewish state in the balance of mandatory Palestine under British rule, they indicated
indirectly that a partitioned territory into Jewish and Arab states in Palestine would be an acceptable
compromise.13  This strategic decision was reinforced by the efforts of the Jewish Agency to cultivate
members of UNSCOP and to present an overall sense of balance in the Jewish presentations; even in
the private and secret meetings with Begin and his extremist group, who made claims even for
Transjordan, the Irgun offered to guarantee equal rights for Arabs.
If Dr. Judah Magnes and the Jewish Communists took the high road of utopian idealism detached from
the day-to-day realities of Palestine, the Jewish Agency employed traditional political strategies and
tactics to argue for partition while presenting the case for a unified Palestine under Jewish rule.
On the one hand the committee members were presented with a utopian dream and a distorted myth of
Arabs and Jews living side by side in eternal friendship.  From the hard-headed politicians, on the other
hand, they were given a different historical mythology of idealistic Jews sacrificing to redeem the soil and
bringing progress, not only to a wasteland but to the Arabs of Palestine.  Ben Gurion recounted his own
migration to Palestine over 40 years earlier to work in the little village of Sojera in the Galilee, plowing
the field with one hand and holding a rifle with the other.  The Jews were painted as the heroic
redeemers of the soil through toil who also had to defend themselves from rabid Arabs who attacked
their settlements without reason, even though offered the Jewish hand of friendship.
Ben Gurion, mixing lofty ideals with personal tales, presented the same line he had used many times
before.  It was a replay of his presentation to the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry—the Jews
brought hard work, the Jews brought prosperity, the Jews brought culture, the Jews brought the hands
of friendship to the ancient homeland, all within and under international agreements which promised the
Jews a homeland in Palestine.  When this story
of heroism was combined with the story of century after century of victimization culminating in the
Holocaust, the marriage of Jewish hero and Jewish victim made a compelling presentation.
But Ben-Gurion’s case was not a coherent one.  For Ben-Gurion’s interpretation of antisemitism was
that whenever you have two groups, one strong and powerful, the other weak and helpless, “the strong
14  If the Jews were to become the economically, intellectually,
politically and militarily powerful group in a united Palestine, would they not then inevitably take
advantage of the weaker Arabs?  Even in a partitioned state with a large minority of Arabs, would not
then the hands of friendship turn into the fist of repression?
Ben-Gurion presented himself as the tough fighter imbued with high ideals.15  One could not be sure
                    
    13cf. Horowitz (    ) 159 and FRUS (1947), Macatee to the U.S. Secretary of State, June 23, 1947, p.   .
    14(1954), 193.
    15This was Ramal's impression of Ben-Gurion as well.  1SA, File 1, Box 2270, convention of Ramal with              ,
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whether one was watching James Cagney playing in a Hollywood fight picture of Danny Kaye as the
Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s Court, marching between the Confederate and Yankee military
positions wearing a Confederate uniform on one half of his body and a Yankee uniform on the other,
with the Confederate flag facing one way and the Yankee flag facing the other.  The Committee did not
require a playful wind to suddenly blow the flags the other way and reveal the subterfuge.  They were an
impressive group, even if inexperienced in the Palestine arena. 
If the experience of the Committee members in Palestine during the month-long inquiry was not enough,
the case against the continuation of the Mandate and for some Jewish state was reinforced by the vast
majority of all Jews who made presentations, whatever their differences.  In the plurality of the views
presented, there was one case made, free from cant and contradictions, which synthesized high morality
with realism, the voice of Chaim Weizmann.
Chaim Weizmann, the retired and respected elder statesman of the Zionist cause, stood out as the voice
of pure practical reason (in contrast to opportunistic reasoning) applying morality to the situation in
Palestine.  Though Ben-Gurion stated that Weizmann spoke only for himself16, it was clear that
Weizmann’s public testimony reinforced the powerful positive impressions of Sandstrom and the other
members of UNSCOP who had met with him previously in a private session in Rechovot.  Chaim
Weizmann’s direct, honest and straightforward appeal for partition as the only conclusion that practical
and moral reasoning could devise provided the centre point to the hearings.  The Committee had been
set up to combine competence and high moral character.17  The Committee members could identify with
Chaim Weizmann.
If Chaim Weizmann seemed to walk the fine line of pure practical reason between Jewish utopian, pure,
unpractical reason and the opportunistic politics of the Jewish Agency, the Arabs presented themselves
as the agents and voice of unreason.  It was not simply that the Palestine Arab leadership boycotted
UNSCOP.  That position, at least had a rationale.  But it was irrational when they would not even meet
with UNSCOP representatives unofficially or devise a practical strategy.  The absolute conviction about
the justice of their case was not put forth as an argument.  And they ignored a strategy of denying their
enemies a victory (which a recommendation for a federal solution would have been) even if they could
not obtain UNSCOP support for their own position.
The unreason of the Arab leadership caught up in the lofty rhetoric of pure justice was matched by the
unreason of the man in the street and the reality of Arab injustice which the Committee itself witnessed. 
It was not simply encounters, such as that of Garcia-Granados’ alternate who heard accusations that
most of the UNSCOP committee members were Jews who deserved to be hanged,18 but the hostility
                                                                              
Aug. 6, 1947.
    16FRUS (1947) July 14, Macatee to Secretary of State, 501.
    17cf. Bercason (1985), 72 taken from a May 15, 1947 memorandum for the Secretary General of the U.N. to the
Canadian Secretary of lState for External Affairs in Canada, Canadian Dept. of External Affairs Files, File
5475-CD-1-40.
This was Rand's impression of Ben Gurion as well.  ISA, File 1, Box 2270, convention of Rand with Horowitz,
August 6, 1947.
    18Garcia-Granados (1948), 82-3.
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they experienced in general towards Jews as Jews, the squalid conditions and the exploitation of the
Arab by their own people, particularly of children in factories.19  If Arab Palestinian politicians more
than complemented Ben-Gurion’s rational political machinations with unreason, Arab Palestine men in
the street offset the utopianism of the Zionist pure idealism demonstrating the widespread prejudice and
exploitation current in Palestine society.
The only possible counter to Chaim Weizmann awaited an encounter with the Arab League in Beirut
and a subsequent side meeting with Abdullah in Amman (held there on the pretext that he could not
meet with them officially in Jersualem since Transjordan was not a U.N. member).  The Arab League
members, however, tried to match rhetoric with Ben Gurion with the promise of future friendship of
Arabs and Jews presented by the Jewish utopians matched in Beirut by the Arab League members’
mythology of past Jewish-Arab co-operation and friendship that had lasted until the Zionists had come
along to disrupt it.  While, on the one hand, decrying the Zionists as the source of all evil in the Middle
East and providing a very tenuous rationale for the Mufti’s alliance with the Nazis in World War II, their
words gave little succour to the committee as they described Jews as a “foreign body” in the Middle
East, in language that echoed Hitler’s antisemitism, and followed this up with the description of the
danger that a foreign body presented if allowed to grow.  Violence and radical surgery were necessary
to excise that foreign body and protect the integral unity of the Arab people.  Unlike Ben Gurion’s
speech, it was a rhetoric of hate combined with a totally unrealistic and exaggerated sense of the
political power of Great Britain as well as the strength of their own economic power and the
susceptibility of Western powers to Arab economic blackmail. 
In Amman, Abdullah was more generous in not demanding the expulsion of the Zionists who arrived
subsequent to the Balfour Declaration and in granting all Jews then present in Palestine citizenship. 
However, he was just as adamantly opposed to further Jewish immigration and a Jewish state in part of
Palestine.  He, like the Arab leaders in Beirut provided a foil for Chaim Weizmann.  Unlike Ben Gurion
they exuded personal ambitions and reverence for power, impracticality and unwillingness to
compromise, and most of all unreason and the denial of any status as a people or a nation to the Jews. 
Instead, the Arab leaders in Beirut depicted them in language that echoed Hitler’s ideology while
denying any commonality with that ideology.
(H.)  FEDERATION OF PARTITION—THE DEBATE
Against the weight of prior experience and conviction, these experiences shifted the weight of the case
from a federal solution towards partition.  Whether that shift could be maintained and build to a majority
and what form it would take depended on the interaction among the committee members and between
the members and the secretariat assigned to them to prepare the recommendations. 
Simic was first off the mark to defend a single state in the form of a federation.  A key factor influencing
him against partition was that Arabs and Jews were scattered throughout the country.  Bi-nationalism for
him was a “murky” concept.  His proposal, however, was an attempt to give a constitutional federal
expression to a bi-national ideal with “equal rights for Arabs and Jews within the framework of a
20  He envisioned the federal government with two houses, one constituted by
                    
    19cf. Blum (1985), p. 85 for an account of the UNSCOP visit to an Arab cigarette factory.
    20August 7, 1947, p. 3.
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representation by population, the other with equal representation from both national groups.  Arab and
Hebrew would both be official languages.  Within the federation there would be self-governing units with
their own powers.  A federal court would have authority to review all laws, including those of the self-
governing units.  The holy places would be internalized.
Lisicky questioned the workability of Simic’s proposal since a common will was lacking in both parties.
 Blom, too, found no real cooperation between the two communities which implied even a federal form
of bi-nationalism was unworkable.             Entezam’s previous position on bi-nationalism, it was clear
that he was amenable to a bi-national state in Simic’s federal form.  Since Rahman opposed partition
and really wanted a unitary state with equal rights for all citizens and no community rights, and though he
also opposed, by definition, a bi-national state n a unitary or federal form, he too would, by a logic of
elimination, end up supporting a federal idea. 
The defenders of partition were Sandstrom, Fabregat and Rand, the latter in the form entailing an
economic union.  Lisicky, in questioning the workability of a federal system, would be left only with
partition, but in the third session expressed a preference for Rand’s proposal for partition with a federal
component—what became the confederation proposals.  Salazar also was inclined toward partition
which gave the group just under half the members.
The waverers were Granados, Hood, and Blom.  Hood, like Blom, questioned how partition could be
enforced.  Further, within the Jewish state there would inevitably be a problem of a large Arab minority.
 The key issues for him were immigration, security and the mode of transition.  Just as the issue of
immigration was the telling one for Salazar in ruling out a federal solution as unworkable, it was that
problem that could push Hood toward partition provided the issue of enforcement and transition could
be resolved.  Federation, on the other hand, “had all of (the) disadvantages of partition and practically
21
Granados, to answer the problem of immigration raised by Salazar, proposed a cantonal federation with
an equal number of Jewish and Arab cantons, but agreed with Sandstrom that this solution did not
satisfy the principle of finality.  He was open to partition.  Blom remained generally sceptical but
focussed his scepticism on partition.  As he said in the fourth session on August 8th, he was “not in
principle against partition...(but was) not yet convinced that partition is the only way out”.22
What would or could cause Granados, Hood, and Blom to shift? 
(I.)  THE ROLE OF THE JEWISH REFUGEES
In the process, one additional historical factor allegedly pushed the committee towards a
recommendation of partition—the plight and wishes of the Jewish refugees in Europe.
From the beginning the committee had accepted the principle of a linkage between Jewish refugees in
Europe and the future of Palestine.  The Arabs had made it clear that they were adamantly opposed to
future Jewish immigration, including Abdullah who was the only Arab leader prepared to offer the Jews
some form of constitutional protection.  Though the committee decided not to visit the camps in Cyprus
where the Jewish refugees, who had tried to run the British blockade, were interned, they received
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confirmation from the
International Refugee Organization that 90 percent of the Jewish refugees wanted to go to Palestine. 
Their own committee of alternate delegates, headed by Hood and accompanied by Fabregat and
Garcia-Granados, set out from Geneva on August 8th to visit the camps just as the committee had begun
to deal with concrete alternative solutions to the problem.
Hood, who headed the committee, had in fact opposed visiting the camps.  When he led the inspection
team he was scrupulous in ensuring that they were not led to see and hear what others wanted them to
see and hear.  They made their own itinerary, selecting a wide cross section of camps as well as the
officials and refugees they would interview.  They returned in slightly over a week to Geneva to report
on August 16th to the overall committee.  The recommendations were clear and unqualified.  Even Dr.
Ali Abdullah of Iran concurred in the report on the camps.  The essence of the report was that:
(1)  Even if alternative options were available for immigration—such      as to the United
States -- 75 percent of the Jewish refugees would      choose to go to Palestine;
(2)  The conditions in the camps two years after World War II had ended      were
atrocious, even though the refugees received sufficient food           and clothing.  The sickness
and poverty of the Jewish refugees from      Romania in the Rothschild Hospital in Vienna made
a particular           impact on the committee.23
(3)  The motives of the refugees were mixed, but belief in zionism as an      ideology was less
important than
     (a)  the inability to resume life in Europe haunted by the                  Holocaust and
     (b)  the fear of rising antisemitism in Europe since it was now               evident even in Great
Britain.24
Did the plight and wishes of the Jewish refugees shift the weight of opinion of the committee members
from federalism to partition?  Was the sub-committee’s visit to the camps the deciding factor?
The direction of the decision was clear before the visit to the camps.  Five favoured or leaned towards
partition:  Sandstrom, Fabregat, Rand, Lisicky and Salazar.  Entezam opposed partition but,
contradicting himself, favoured Rand’s idea25 then a unitary and finally a federal state.  Three were
opposed:  Simic favoured a federal solution; Rahman favoured a unitary state; Granados favoured a
cantonal scheme, but was open to partition.  Hood and Blom had not committed themselves.  Did the
report on the camps produce the shift?
One way to judge what influenced the committee members is to note any shifts in thinking between
August 8th and August 16th when the sub-committee returned with their report.
Before the committee even left to visit the camps, the issue was no longer partition or federalism, but
what form of partition would be adopted and whether there would be any connections between the
partitioned parts to form some economic union.  Further, Rand had made clear in his discussions with
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Horowitz26 that he favoured the internationalization of Jerusalem.  Since Salazar was a conservative
Catholic very attentive to the concerns of the church, it was clear that the support of Salazar and Rand
for partition would come with a caveat—the exclusion of Jerusalem from either the Jewish or the Arab
state.
The debate had moved beyond federalism versus partition, to what form partition would take. 
Federalism was no longer a serious contender.  It could not muster a majority.  How did two of the
three members opposing partition (including Entezam) shift to support federalism?  Did the report on the
camps have any impact on the shift in their opinions?  Since the shift became formalized when Simic,
Rahman and Ertezam agreed to form a working group on a Federal State on August 20th, after the sub-
committee had reported, the visits to the camps may have had some impact on the shift, but from the
record of the discussions, if it did, it was not an evident or a very important factor.
What about the shift of Granados, Hood and Blom towards partition?  Two factors seemed to play an
important role in the shift.  First, there were the arguments and clear opposition to a binational state,
even in a federal form.  When Simic brought forth his constitutional federal version of a binational state
with a bicameral legislature, with equal Jewish and Arab representation in the upper house, he received
no direct support; only Rahman appeared as a potential ally. 
If Rahman, Simic and Ertezam wanted to increase the support for a more pro-Arab position, they
would have to unite on a federal solution, solidify Granados’ position—who was the most overtly pro-
Zionist member and an unlikely ally.  Even if they convinced Hood and Blom who were more sceptical
of a federal solution than partition, they would only have five supporters.  They just did not have the
numbers.
It was not the humanitarian plight of the Jewish refugees in Europe but the politics of the committee that
were critical in making federalism a minority recommendation and partition the recommendation of the
majority.  But the visit may have had an impact on Hood, who headed the committee and had not made
up his mind.  It did seem to impact on Blom, who in his memorandum focussed on the process of
transition as the essential elements in the solution rather than the solution itself—the need for both a
transitional period (an interim trusteeship) and enforcement.
The clue to what influenced him is provided in his concern that no solution could be put into effect
against the will or possibly even active resistance of both Jews and Arabs.  “The willing cooperation of
at least one of the communities would be vital if not indispensible.”27  Partition would earn the enmity of
both the Jews and the Arabs.
However, the plight of the refugees clearly had an impact.  Blom echoed others in seeing the issue of
immigration as critical.  In fact, and opposed to Sandstrom who started with the political structure, it
was the “essential prelude to a definitive solution”.28  But the impact was more in the direction of
Bunche’s thinking than one compelling partition.  For him,
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    27p. 7.
    28p. 3.
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in the minds of many Jews (my italics) the problem of the
Jews in the D.P. camps and the plight of the distressed
Jews in Eastern Europe is by far the most urgent.  Jewish
propaganda exploits this situation to the utmost and employs
it as a means of encouraging Jewish national aspirations.29
In contrast to the view that a Jewish state provided the only home for those helpless Jews, Blom saw
the situation of the intolerable conditions as a tool to influence world public opinion and blind people to
the Arab fear of a flood of Jewish immigration.  He went on to call for easing the plight of the Jewish,
the D.P. camps and in Eastern Europe to lessen the pressure of the immigration problem and allay Arab
fears.
These words do not indicate Blom was influenced by the camp report.
(J.)  THE INFLUENCE OF BUNCHE
There was another key factor—Ralph Bunche.  Bunche was the key U.N. civil servant on UNSCOP. 
Bunche, in his heart of hearts, opposed partition.30  He questioned the economic viability of what he saw
as a truncated Arab Palestinian state and foresaw a reactionary quasi-fascist regime emerging to rule in
the Arab territory, thereby threatening the future relationship between the Jewish and Arab states.  This
would, in turn, threaten the prospect of maintaining peace in the Middle East.31  He initially believed that
Jews were more interested in saving the remnant in Europe than in a state32, echoing a preeminent
American concern with the refugees, which is probably a key source of the belief that the concern with
Jewish refugees and the Holocaust was a decisive factor in the U.N.’s and UNSCOP’s deliberations.
Bunche was also aware that partition was unacceptable to Britain.  If the British were to be relieved of
the Mandate as soon as possible, and, at the same time, assume some responsibility for the transition to
a new political era, British co-operation was central.  Finally, the U.S. State Department was also not
enamoured with partition.  Loy Henderson, the head of the office off Near Eastern and African Affairs,
thought a partitioned Jewish state was antithetical to the principle of self-determination33 and even
favoured a binational rather than a federal solution.34  The key work and drafting of the recommendation
for the federal state solution was undertaken by Bunche.
Why did Bunche favour federalism if any federal plan required good will between Arabs and Jews and
this was the key ingredient “completely lacking” in Palestine and the biggest single flaw he found in all of
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    31Israeli Archives, F.O., file 1, box 2270, Bunche, Eban and Horowitz Conversation, August 3, 1947.  cf. Bercasan
(1984), p. 93.
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Rahman’s modifications, qualifications and complications.35  Because Bunche did not believe in good
will to carry out his federal scheme, but in the authority that the U.N. could and would have as the
interim ruler of Palestine with presumably, Britain as the administrator on behalf of the U.N.  In fact,
both the majority and minority reports of UNSCOP would include this recommendation so that the
U.N. would, in fact, be given the interim legal authority it did not have when Britain referred the
Palestine problem to the U.N.
Thus, the synergy of the politics of the committee and the convictions of its key civil servant, Ralph
Bunche, acted to reintroduce the federal option into the committee deliberations.  It was not that Bunche
acted in any way except as the proper international civil servant.  He was scrupulous, almost too
scrupulous, in not pushing the committee.  Weeks before the deadline for the UNSCOP report, there
was little sign of any detailed agreement let alone a completed document.  Some argue that if it was not
for Bunche, there is every likelihood there would have been no report.36  It was not simply that Bunche
was adept in the politics of moving a committee along, but he was a fount of knowledge and an
indefatigable work horse who strived tirelessly to ensure that a draft paper emerged reflecting the
thinking of the committee.
But it was precisely because he played this role that he was so influential.  In retrospect it seems clear
that without his input, the minority report on a federal solution would have had little substance.  In fact, it
is just as likely there would have only been one report with three dissenters.  It gave Hood the excuse to
abstain based on an objection to a divided report.37
It is ironic that Ivan Rand, the man whom Bunche regarded as “an elderly, crotchety gentleman”, “the
greatest disappointment” in the committee, an incessant talker with nothing to say, should have been
considered by the most eminent contemporary historian of this period, William Roger Louis, to have
been, “the greatest single influence within the committee”38 and, further to be the one, together with
Bunche, to have most influenced the outcome of the report—the very shape the partition proposal itself
took with its recommendations for an economic union and for a separate status for Jerusalem.  Rand’s
support also seemed to be important to influence future British cooperation39, though of course it had
none as Britain refused to cooperate.
Bunche’s resentment of Rand is understandable.  Rand’s early support for partition was crucial.  It was
Rand who opposed partition unless it was within a larger economic union.  Rand concurred in the Jews
having sufficient political independence to control immigration but, at the same time, wanted to preserve
the integrity of Palestine as one economic and social polis.  Rand supported partition  1) when
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18
18
Fabregat’s partition proposal was amended to include economic union as a sine qua non and not just a
recommended future path for the two independent states, and 2) when the committee recommended a
separate status for Jerusalem.  This also ensured Salazar’s support for partition as well.40
Rand was the most influential person on this committee because he was able to exact important changes
in the partition proposal to ensure partition had a good majority.  But as a condition of enabling that
majority to emerge, the straight-forward partition proposal that even Bunche regarded as “far
41 to either Rand’s initial proposal or the proposal of the final report, had to be severely
qualified, modified and encumbered.  Further, it meant that Bunche’s original propensity for a long-term
U.N. trusteeship or the federal solution that Bunche worked so hard to draft would not succeed, though
it was included as a minority report.
If either of the sub-committees of the partition committee had broken down, either on the constitutional
issue of the extent of unity between the divided parts, or over the serpentine boundaries of the two
states42, if the decision on partition had proven impossible to implement even in the thoughts of the
committee members, then the minority federal state proposal of UNSCOP would have emerged
victorious.  It was the predisposition of the key civil servant.  It was the predisposition of the majority of
committee members before they joined UNSCOP.  It was the compromise to which those adamantly in
favour of either a unitary state or a binational state had reluctantly moved.  But it was the compromise
and the convictions of the UNSCOP majority partition proposal that enabled a majority in favour of
partition to be garnered.
(K.)  THE KEY FACTORS AND FINAL REPORT
Why did the committee support partition?  It was not the plight of the Jewish refugees in Europe or the
guilt over the Holocaust and the humanitarianism of the committee members that was crucial,43 though
the alternative disposition of the refugees was a matter of general concern predisposing most committee
members to give the Jews control over immigration, whatever solution was chosen.  As Abba Eban
perceptively reported back to the Jewish Agency on August 4th, “practical considerations” would
dictate the solution.44  Not compassion.  Not abstract reason or pure principles of justice.  Not the skill
of the Zionist lobbyists or the lack of skill of the Arabs.  As the final report accurately noted, it was the
reality that already existed in Palestine that determined the outcome.
Two independent communities existed in Palestine.  They were mature enough to run their own affairs
and possessed the institutions and resources to do so.  They lacked the will to do it together.  And there
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was more than enough ill will to prevent any attempts at forced co-operation being successful.
The predispositions of UNSCOP favoured a federal solution, but the reality of two separate and
irreconcilable communities in Palestine and the politics of the committee led to a majority
recommendation in favour of partition. 
In 11 of the recommendations, the committee was in unanimous agreement, including 5 important ones: 
the Mandate would be terminated and independence achieved at the earliest possible date; the authority
administering Palestine in the interim between the Mandate and independence should be responsible to
the United Nations45; there should be adequate protection of the rights of minorities and of religious
interests; economic unity of Palestine should be preserved as indispensable to the development of the
country; immediate action should be taken on behalf of the displaced Jews in Europe.
The majority of the committee46 recommended partitioning Palestine into Jewish and Arab states while
placing Jerusalem under an international trusteeship.  To the Jews would go approximately 57% of the
land—most of the coastal plain (the best agricultural land) including the Eastern Galilee and most of the
Negev desert, including the north-east, central and southern portions.  Within the Jewish state, the initial
population would be approximately 498,000 Jews and 407,000 Arabs.  The Arab state, largely in
central Palestine, would comprise 725,000 Arabs and 10,000 Jews.  each state consisted of three
pieces of territory, meeting at two points.  Jewish immigration would be limited to 150,000 persons47 for
a two-year transition period; thereafter, if independence had not yet been achieved, 60,000 Jews would
be allowed to immigrate yearly.  On achieving independence, it would be the responsibility of the Jewish
state to determine the number of people it felt it could absorb.
Though there would be restrictions on the entry of people via the external boundary in the initial two
years, i.e., restrictions on Jewish immigration, the assumption was the boundary between the two states
would not be a barrier to the movement of people or goods, and that the two states would be joined in
economic union—covering customs, currency, transportation, joint ports at Haifa and Jaffa—and
undertake a common economic program, including land reclamation, soil conservation and irrigation. 
Independence would be granted when either or both states adopted a democratic constitution, declared
its intention to respect holy places, religious and minority rights, and signed a ten-year treaty of
economic union.  In the interim (conceived of a few years at the maximum) the British would “carry on
the administration of the territory of Palestine under the auspices of the United Nations and on such
conditions ... as may be agreed upon between the United Kingdom and the United Nations”.
                    
    45It was recognized that the transition to independence would be difficult, and for this reason the administering
authority should be responsible to and receive support from the United Nations.  "The responsibility for
administering Palestine during the transitional period and preparing it for independence will be a heavvy one...Certain
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    47This represented 60% of the estimated number of Jewish refugees in Europe, 75 % of whom, according to
UNSCOP's own conclusion, wanted to go to Palestine even if other avenues for immigration were open.
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The stated and rhetorical assumption behind the UNSCOP partition plan, which the majority admitted
would be difficult to realize, was that
the setting is one from which, with good will and a spirit of co-operation, may arise a rebirth in
historical surroundings of the genius of each people ... The Jews bring to the land the social
dynamism and scientific method of the West;
the Arabs confront them with individualism and intuitive
understanding of life.  Here then is this close association,
through the natural emulation of each other can be evolved a
synthesis of the two civilizations...48
The minority in UNSCOP, India, Iran and Yugoslavia (all with sizable Muslim populations)
recommended a federal state with Jewish and Arab provinces.  A United Nations authority would
administer Palestine for a three-year transition period and would draw up a constitution allowing for a
two-chamber legislature—one with equal Arab and Jewish representation, one elected by proportional
representation.49  Jewish immigration would be controlled by the United Nations authority until
independence; thereafter, it would be the responsibility of a federal government that, as could be
foreseen, would limit immigration severely.
It does not take hindsight to recognize neither plan could likely work unless reinforced with considerable
external pressure.  The Arabs could not and would not co-operate with a proposal which awarded
control of almost 60% of the land to just over one-third of the population50, quite aside from their
complete unreadiness to see any territory whatsoever sliced away from the Arab domain and given
away to those whom they regarded as outsiders, as cast- off Europeans.  Further, even in the part
allocated to the Jews, Arabs would constitute almost half the population in the beginning, but it would be
a Jewish state in which, through immigration, Arabs would become a smaller and smaller minority. 
Further, the two populations had been at odds over the future of Palestine since the 1920’s.  The
majority solution clearly depended on good will, of which there was little sign, and a pro-western
colonial mentality—that is, the Jews had the industry and skills, coming as they did from the West, while
the local population was granted an “intuitive understanding of life”, an attribute that said more about the
ignorance and romanticism of the West than the character of the local population.
Nor did the minority report have a chance either.  Since it clearly rejected the idea of a Jewish
homeland and provided for no resolution of the Jewish refugee problem, neither the Jews nor the United
States could be expected to live with that solution.  Further, before the United Nations, the Arabs had
consistently and publicly demanded a unitary state and opposed a federal solution.51
When problems do not admit of any easy, peaceful resolution, and there is no one in a position to
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impose a solution, then they are usually resolved by power or the threat and fear of power weighed
against the potential gains if fighting is avoided.  A civil war was clearly imminent, and do what it might
to forestall it, the United Nations debate and resolution were more important in providing moral support
for the competing parties than in heading off the conflict which now appeared inevitable.
